Theory Tea - 2010-2011
Posted: Wed Oct 13, 2010 3:50 pm
Συνεχίζονται και φέτος τα αγαπημένα theory teas ξεκινώντας αυτήν την Παρασκευή στην αίθουσα Α36 στις 16:00. Παραθέτω το θέμα της ομιλίας του κ.Μαρκάκη.
Οπότε τα λέμε την Παρασκευή και την επόμενη βδομάδα έκτακτα την Πέμπτη. Πραγματικά αξίζει να έρθετε όσοι δεν το τολμάτεGeia se olous,
opws eixa pei,
ksekiname authn thn Paraskeuh.
Tha dwsw mia omilia gia cooperative games.
Stis prohgoumenes parousiaseis eidame arketa themata panw se non-cooperative games,
paixnidia dhladh opou kathe paikths einai on his own kai krinei panta me bash to diko tou utility.
Thn Paraskeuh tha doume ena diaforetiko montelo paigniwn opou epitrepetai h sunergasia metaksu paiktwn.
Tha kanoume prwta mia mikrh eisagwgh gia cooperative games kai meta tha parousiasw kapoia themata apo mia prosfath ergasia mas (akolouthei titlos kai abstract).
Opws panta sthn A36 stis 4.
Thn epomenh ebdomada, to tea tha ginei Pempth stis 11 kathws o omilhths (pou einai enas apo tous symmetexontes sto sunedrio SAGT thn epomenh ebdomada)
den mporouse na meinei Ellada parapanw meres.
Algorithmic Aspects of the Core in Cooperative Games over Graphs
(joint work with Georgios Chalkiadakis and Nick R. Jennings)
In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment might
constrain the formation of certain coalitions among agents. For instance,
this is the case in sensor and telecommunication networks,
or multiagent settings with restricted inter-agent communication.
Examining the stability of formed coalition structures in such settings
has not received much attention to date. We address this by considering various
models of cooperative games defined on a graph structure. First, we focus
on characteristic function games (CFGs) defined on graphs. These
are regular transferable utility games, along with a graph that determines
which coalitions are feasible. In particular, a coalition S
can emerge only if S is a connected set in the graph.
We study the notion of the core, which is the set of payoff allocations such that no
subset of players has an incentive to deviate.
More precisely, we look at the modified version, in which it suffices to check
only deviations that are feasible (connected sets). We investigate the non-emptiness
of the core as well as the complexity of computing stable configurations.
We then present some extensions to the more general class of partition
function games (PFGs), where the value of a coalition depends
on which other coalitions are present in the environment. Finally, we investigate “Bayesian” extensions,
in which information regarding the success of a deviation is provided
in the form of a probability distribution describing the possible reactions
of non-deviating agents.