Link
- Spoiler: εμφάνιση/απόκρυψη
June 1, 2010 | 0002 GMT
Israel: More Tactical Details on the Flotilla Raid
An Israeli corvette launches a rigid-hull inflatable boat in preparation for the raid on the Gaza-bound aid flotilla on May 31
Reports are spreading in the Israeli media that the Israeli Shayetet 13 commandos who boarded the MV Mavi Marmara the night of May 30 were armed primarily with paintball guns, and were only carrying live ammunition in their sidearms. The implication is that the Israelis seriously underestimated the resistance they would encounter in boarding the ship.
There are two key issues here. First, STRATFOR is unaware of paintballs having made the transition from training rounds (which they are indeed used for extensively) to operationally useful non-lethal technology — such as rubber bullets. It is the substance of the non-lethal round and the force which propels it that determines whether it will be able to put down an assailant, and paintballs are far less incapacitating than other readily available projectiles. While paintballs may in fact have been used, it would be unusual for Israel to go into such a high-profile and densely packed situation (there were more than 600 activists aboard the Marmara) with an unproven or only lightly proven technology, especially for a country with such extensive experience with exactly this sort of crowd control.
But more important than whether there is any veracity to this claim is what it suggests. The Israelis, who deal regularly with not only pro-Palestinian activists but Palestinians and hard-line Jewish settlers, are well aware of both the challenges of hostile civilian crowds and how an encounter will be manipulated for public consumption. By suggesting that a highly regarded Israeli special operations unit boarded a ship with some 600 activists prepared for this very eventuality armed with paintball guns and live ammunition only for semi-automatic pistols — yet somehow killed as many as 20 people and wounded many more (though casualty figures are also very much in dispute) — does not on its face seem likely.
It is possible these claims are essentially true, and the Israelis profoundly underestimated the resistance they would face. We find this hard to believe, given Israelʼs extensive experience with this sort of group and their likely tactical situational awareness. It would be impossible for the Israelis not to know that on a ship full of loosely-associated activists from all over the world, there would be some individuals ready to violently oppose any Israeli soldiers boarding the vessel.
By claiming the Shayetet 13 commandos boarded the ship only intending to use paintball guns, and resorted to using their sidearms as a last resort after facing tough resistance from those on board, Israel can try to dispel the notion asserted by the pro-Palestinian media campaign that the raid was a vicious assault on unarmed civilians, undermining its propaganda value.
The situation was set into motion with the intention of causing far-ranging geopolitical consequences. The pro-Palestinian activists clearly set the bait for Israel to overreact, and Israel is believed to have done so judging by the response from media outlets, street demonstrators and politicians in Europe, Turkey and the Middle East.
But the last noteworthy point is that for all Israelʼs experience with non-lethal action and managing violent civilian populations, this is not Shayetet 13ʼs core competency — they specialize in more aggressive and hostile boarding operations, so a civilian opposition would not necessarily be their area of expertise. A late attempt to rig some non-lethal capability onto one of the more lethally-oriented units in the Israel Defense Forces could well have contributed to some of the violence, though it is clear that whatever their armament, these commandos dropped into an extremely bad tactical situation.
), έχω πολύ μεγάλη περιέργεια να δω πως θα πάνε οι σχέσεις τους με Τουρκια μιας και τους παίζει και τους 2 με κοινά νήματα η Aμερική.
